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This paper assesses the importance of adverse health shocks as triggers of bankruptcy
filings. We view car crashes as a proxy for health shocks and draw on a large sample of
police crash reports linked to hospital admission records and bankruptcy case files. We
report two findings: (i) there is a strong positive correlation between an individual’s pre-
shock financial condition and his or her likelihood of su↵ering a health shock, an example
of behavioral consistency; and (ii) after accounting for this simultaneity, we are unable
to identify a causal e↵ect of health shocks on bankruptcy filing rates. These findings
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1 Introduction
A large literature assesses household financial fragility by examining responses to
unexpected shocks such as job loss, marital divorce, health problems, and natural disasters.
If households are not fully insured through financial markets or self-insurance, these shocks
can generate financial distress, as measured by consumer defaults or bankruptcy filings. The
sensitivity of households to shocks of various magnitudes is relevant both to academic studies
of risk-sharing as well as to policy debates about the design of public insurance programs
and the administration of debt relief laws.
Health problems in particular are an important source of individual financial risk
and are commonly thought to be an important driver of consumer bankruptcy filings. Pres-
ident Obama and members of Congress cited the phenomenon of “medical bankruptcy”—
bankruptcy filings triggered by health care costs—in speeches advocating the recent health
care reform legislation (Jacoby and Holman 2010). Members of Congress have also proposed
legislation that would make the Bankruptcy Code more generous for consumers with signif-
icant health-related debts (an example is the “Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2009”).
These public policy arguments find support in several well-known studies, including Himmel-
stein et al. (2005, 2010), which examined bankruptcy files and found substantial medical bills
(around $5,000) in over half of the cases.
Although these studies have played an important role in academic and policy debates,
they do not show whether adverse health conditions cause bankruptcy filings in the sense
that households would not have filed for bankruptcy if these conditions had not occurred
(or were better insured against). An alternative hypothesis is that long-term background
characteristics, such as personal financial management or underlying risk preferences, are the
fundamental drivers of financial distress and bankruptcy filing rates. Background personal
characteristics could simultaneously elevate the probability of developing health conditions
and experiencing financial default. This potentially complex relationship between personal
health and financial management presents a fundamental challenge to properly identifying
the causal impact of health shocks on financial distress.
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Our paper makes two contributions. First, we confirm empirically that common
variables a↵ect both financial and bodily health. We show this by studying car crashes,
which we view as a type of shock that exposes households to health problems. We draw
on a unique panel dataset that links (i) police reports from all car crashes in Utah during
1992 through 2005 to (ii) hospital admission records and (iii) bankruptcy case files that allow
us to measure bankruptcy filing rates before and after crashes. Using these data, we find
that background driver characteristics are important determinants of both the probability of
experiencing a crash and the probability of filing for bankruptcy. In particular, drivers who
sustained severe accidents had substantially higher bankruptcy filing rates—both before and
after the crashes—relative to drivers who experienced only minor accidents. This di↵erence
persists even when we focus only on drivers who were judged by the police to be “not at
fault” for their accidents.
These findings strongly indicate that unobservable driver characteristics elevate both
the risk of a severe accident and the probability of a bankruptcy filing—a type of behavioral
consistency—and suggest a possible bias in prior studies that fail to account for the joint
determination of household shocks and financial distress.
We address this bias using a new di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DD) strategy that exploits
the panel construction of our data. We construct two groups of drivers: a treatment group
that experienced crashes in period t, and an observationally similar control group that expe-
rienced equally severe crashes in period t+n. We compare the treatment and control groups
during the n   1 periods (quarters or years) before and after period t. During this period,
only drivers in the treatment group experienced a crash. We compare the bankruptcy filing
rates of treatment and control group drivers before and after period t to estimate the causal
e↵ect of this type of health shock on bankruptcy filing rates. This empirical strategy deals
with secular time trends in bankruptcy filing rates, which are a strong feature of our data.
More importantly, by conditioning on crash severity, this strategy allows for the possibility
that treatment and control group drivers share a common (unobservable) characteristic that
jointly determines bankruptcy filing rates and the propensity to experience a crash. By con-
ditioning on this unobservable heterogeneity across drivers, we can test the causal e↵ect of a
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health shock among drivers with similar background financial characteristics.1
Our empirical strategy assumes that treatment and control group drivers are compa-
rable during the years immediately before and after the treatment date. It also assumes that
the timing of a crash, conditional on its severity, is independent of the bankruptcy filing rate.
We present evidence consistent with both assumptions.
The second contribution of our paper is that, after accounting for the joint determi-
nation of accident risk and financial risk, we find no evidence that the health shocks investi-
gated here are a cause of bankruptcy filings. Among drivers with an average hospital charge
around $13,000 (measured in year 2012 dollars), we observe no increase in the probability of
a bankruptcy filing, relative to the control group, through the first three years following the
crash. This finding persists when we subset on drivers who are less likely to be fully insured
(at-fault drivers, uninsured drivers, and drivers who incurred health care costs substantially
in excess of state-mandated insurance levels) and drivers who are plausibly more financially
fragile (drivers between ages 35 and 45, those living in lower-income zip codes, and those
driving with children, who may also have been injured).
These findings indicate that one of the most commonly observed health shocks—
automobile crashes—is not an important driver of bankruptcy filings. One interpretation is
that the typical driver (at least in Utah) is fully insured against the shocks arising from auto-
mobile crashes measured at di↵erent magnitudes, at least with respect to filing for bankruptcy.
This interpretation is interesting given several facts about insurance markets. First, although
not-at-fault drivers can recover some of the costs of crashes—which include bodily harm, prop-
erty damage, and wage loss—by drawing on the legally mandated personal liability insurance
of at-fault drivers, not all at-fault drivers cary su cient insurance. In 2007, eight percent
of Utah drivers lacked any auto insurance (Insurance Research Council 2009). Second, the
at-fault drivers must draw on other forms of insurance to cover both their own injuries as
well as the injuries of the not at-fault-driver. As noted above, at-fault drivers may not hold
liability insurance to cover the costs of the other driver. Additionally, a substantial fraction
of at-fault drivers do not carry health insurance to cover all medical expenses arising from
1A similar empirical strategy is employed by Hilger (2013), who uses variation in the time of treatment,
conditional upon treatment, as the principal source of variation.
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an automobile crash. In 2009, seventeen percent of adult Utahns (aged 19 to 64) had no
health insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts 2010). Although Utah re-
quires drivers to carry a minimum of $3,000 in “personal injury protection” insurance to cover
medical costs from crashes, our findings persist when we focus on severe crashes in which
the average medical charge was about $16,000. It is also likely that a substantial fraction
of at-fault drivers do not carry personal automobile collision insurance su cient to cover
the costs of their own property damage. Despite the incomplete nature of formal insurance
coverage—particularly among at-fault drivers—we conclude that a combination of formal and
informal insurance mechanisms are su cient to prevent a consumer bankruptcy filing after
shocks of the magnitudes investigated in our paper.
Related Literature. Our paper intersects three literatures. The first focuses on the de-
terminants of consumer bankruptcy. A number of papers have emphasized the financial
fragility of households and the link between adverse events and bankruptcy filing rates. In
an important line of studies, Himmelstein, et al. (2010, 2005) survey bankruptcy filers and
elicit information about medical expenditures prior to the bankruptcy filings, reporting in
their most recent work that illness or medical bills contributed to at least sixty-two percent
of the bankruptcies. Similar findings—that medical expenditures are an important driver
of bankruptcy filings—are reported by Miller (2011), Lindblad et al. (2011), Robertson et
al. (2010), Gross and Notowidigdo (2009), Jacoby et al. (2001), and Domowitz and Sartain
(1999).
Other studies are more skeptical about a causal link between idiosyncratic shocks
and bankruptcy filing rates. Fay et al. (2002) find no correlation between self-reported health
problems and the probability of a bankruptcy filing, after controlling for debt levels. Dranove
and Millenson (2006) argue that the high prevalence of self-reported medical debts does not
necessarily imply that medical debts were a causal contributor to most bankruptcy filings.
Hollingworth et al. (2007) compare pre- and post-operation bankruptcy filing rates after brain
or spinal cord surgery and find a temporary increase in filing rates during the first two years
after the operation, but no permanent increase (filing rates return to their pre-operation level
after five years). Hankins et al. (2011) find no correlation between positive shocks (winning
5
the lottery) and bankruptcy filing rates. Positive shocks tend to delay bankruptcy filings,
but do not produce a permanent reduction in filing rates.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on behavioral consistency, including
Barksy et al. (1997), and Cronquist et al. (2012). These papers have found a positive relation
between an individual’s risk preferences in di↵erent settings (e.g., volatile stock investments,
risky entrepreneurship, and consumption of alcohol and tobacco). Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002) suggest that entrepreneurs may be more risk tolerant than others, while
Pollmann (2011) finds a correlation between risk preferences and occupational sorting.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature testing whether households are insured
against idiosyncratic shocks. Beginning with Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994), this
literature has frequently rejected full insurance for certain types of shocks, such as long ill-
ness and involuntary job loss. Many of these papers ignore potential heterogeneity in risk
preference across individuals. Two exceptions are Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndelen (2005). In work similar to ours, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) finds
that risk-tolerant individuals pick jobs with higher earnings risk and, that after account-
ing for this risk heterogeneity, the e↵ect of income shocks on consumption is economically
and statistically small. To be sure, much of this literature focuses primarily on whether
household consumption varies in response to household exposure to shocks, whereas we focus
on bankruptcy. It is possible for shocks to a↵ect household consumption without a↵ecting
bankruptcy filing rates (a consumer, for example, can default on credit card debt without
filing for bankruptcy).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, hypotheses, and
empirical approach. Section 3 presents our main results using our di↵erence-in-di↵erence
identification approach. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Approach
2.1 Background
Automotive crashes are a frequent cause of injury in the United States, harming
about 2.8 percent of licensed drivers during 2008.2 Crashes yield substantial costs: they are
2NHTSA reports 5.8 million police-reported crashes and 208.3 million licensed drivers during 2008. See
NHTSA, Tra c Safety Facts 2008.
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the leading leading cause of death for Americans under 35 years of age and represent one
of the biggest sources of idiosyncratic risk for drivers. Using data from 2000, Parry et al.
(2007) estimate that injury-producing car crashes generated $433 billion in costs, including
quality-adjusted life years, property damage, travel delay, medical expenditures, wage loss,
and other losses. These costs average $13,766 per crash, about one-third of median household
income during 2000. However, some losses itemized by Parry et al. (2007) do not represent
immediate reductions in income or out-of-pocket expenditures and therefore may not alter an
individual’s bankruptcy probability. Focusing only on losses that a↵ect a driver’s cash flow,
the average cost per crash is about $6,656. Among crashes that generate serious bodily injury,
but not death, the average cost rises to about $40,176, almost equal to median household
income.
Medical expenditures form a substantial fraction of the costs generated by automobile
crashes. Among crashes that cause bodily injury, medical expenditures account for eighty-
four percent of the average cost of the most serious crashes and about one third of the cost
of minor-injury crashes.3 These stylized facts suggest that automotive crashes can be viewed
as an important shock to health status and financial well-being.4
A potential confound arises from tort (accident) law. In Utah, and elsewhere, an at-
fault driver is generally obligated to compensate injuries su↵ered by the not at-fault driver.
Additionally, Utah law requires all drivers to carry liability insurance, which will be used to
compensate not at-fault drivers. Although about eight percent of Utah drivers fail to purchase
liability insurance (Insurance Research Council 2009), the typical not at-fault driver can
expect to be at least partially compensated in the event of a crash, though there are limits
to both typical liability insurance payments as well as the categories of damages that are
covered. Therefore, it would not be surprising if we found no significant correlation between
crash severity and bankruptcy filing rates among not at-fault drivers. We have di↵erent
expectations, however, regarding at-fault drivers. These drivers bear the costs of a crash
and must rely on privately purchased market insurance, public insurance programs, and self-
3A “minor-injury crash” is defined by Parry et al. (2007) as one that reduces quality-adjusted life years
by less than $4,500, using data from calendar year 2000.
4See also Doyle (2005).
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insurance to cover their costs. In the analysis below, we will distinguish between drivers
generally and at-fault drivers.
Even if we observe an e↵ect of crash severity on bankruptcy filing rates, we cannot
assume that the e↵ect is due entirely to medical costs. Automobile crashes result in a va-
riety of financial costs, including property damage and work loss. Although we explore the
e↵ects of these other losses in our analysis below, we are ultimately unable to isolate their
importance relative to medical costs. For example, we hypothesize that the importance of
property damage will vary with the age of the car. Holding bodily injury constant, damage
to a relatively new car (manufactured within five years of the crash) is likely to be more
costly to the driver than damage to an older car. Newer cars tend to have greater resale
value and higher repair costs than older ones. Drivers also often purchase new cars with
loans. Therefore, drivers with new cars may be more heavily indebted—and more financially
unstable—than those with older cars.
2.2 Data
We use data on a comprehensive universe of vehicle crashes in Utah during 1992–2005.
The data are drawn from the Crash Outcome Data Evaluation System (CODES) maintained
by the University of Utah. CODES is a federally-funded project that links police-recorded
crash data with hospital admissions records. To date, twenty-six states have developed
CODES databases (U.S. D.O.T. 2010). Utah data were chosen because they cover a longer
period than data maintained by most of the other states (Utah was one of six states selected
in 1992 to pilot the CODES program) and because the University of Utah was interested in
linking these data to bankruptcy filings.
The Utah database includes information about vehicle make and model; date, time,
and location of the crash; speed of cars prior to impact; area of car that was damaged;
police assessment of fault and bodily injury severity; driver age, gender, and zip code; and
a variety of other crash characteristics. If a driver subsequently visited a hospital, CODES
records the hospital treatment, expenditure, and duration of stay; whether the driver received
emergency room treatment only or was admitted to the hospital; whether the driver carried
medical insurance; and other medical information.
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We link CODES data to Utah bankruptcy filings during the period January 1992
through May 2010. Our bankruptcy data are obtained from the PACER website for the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and include every consumer filing during the
sample period (including both Chapter 7 and 13 cases). We match crashes to bankruptcy
filings based on the driver’s last name, zip code, and last four digits of his or her social security
number.5 Through this linkage, we create a panel dataset that tracks the bankruptcy behavior
of drivers during the years before and after a crash.
The CODES data provide a comprehensive universe of accidents in Utah during this
period. A crash is excluded form our analysis under the following conditions:
1. The crash involves a driver who had another crash within the preceding three years.
This exclusion alleviates the potential confounding e↵ect of multiple crashes during the
treatment period.
2. The driver died during the crash. Our data do not allow us to track bankruptcy filings
by the deceased driver’s family.
3. The driver’s residence was outside Utah. Because these drivers will typically file for
bankruptcy in their states of residence, their filings will not be included in our data.
4. The date of the crash is missing.
5. The crash represents the seventh or higher crash of a driver. We analyze the e↵ect of
the first six crashes experienced by a driver. A very small fraction of drivers have more
than six crashes during our study period.
In addition, we subset on drivers who were between ages 25 and 55 at the time of
their crash. Drivers younger than 25 are less likely to be financially independent, and drivers
over age 55 tend to have relatively low bankruptcy filing rates.
In much of the analysis below, we will compare all crashes to those in which the driver
was deemed “at-fault” for the crash. We say that a driver was “at-fault” if (i) the driver was
5An overview of Utah’s linking procedure and citations to the relevant literature are available at
http://www.utcodes.org/probabilisticLinkage/index.html.
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involved in a two-car crash and (ii) police records indicate that the driver was at-fault. Not
at-fault drivers are identified similarly. We exclude from the fault analysis crashes in which
the driver’s fault is less clear, including one-car crashes and multi-car crashes.
Table I presents basic information from our linked dataset: total number of annual
crashes and yearly bankruptcy filing rate. Among these drivers, our data include roughly
382,000 crashes over a fourteen-year period, 1992–2005. The bankruptcy filing rate doubles
over this period among drivers who su↵ered crashes, rising from one percent to over two
percent. This pattern mirrors trends among Utahns generally, as seen in comparison with
the final column of Table I, which presents annual bankruptcy filing rates among Utahns
aged eighteen or older.
Because we study crashes in Utah, we cannot be confident that our analysis below
would yield similar estimates in other states. Utah had one of the highest bankruptcy filing
rates in the United States during our period of study (See Lown (2008)). Indeed, it had the
nation’s highest filing rate during the early 2000s. On the other hand, scholars such as Lown
(2008) have argued that the determinants of bankruptcy filing rates in Utah are similar to
the determinants elsewhere in the United States. Medical debt, in particular, is thought to
be a major contributor to bankruptcy in Utah as in other states.
2.3 The Key Identification Challenge: Behavioral Consistency in Driving
and Financial Decisions
Perhaps the most straightforward empirical strategy would exploit di↵erences in crash
severity among observationally similar drivers. We could, for example, define a treatment
group as drivers who su↵ered high-severity crashes (“high-severity drivers”) and a control
group as comparable drivers with low-severity crashes (“low-severity drivers”). We would
then test whether the probability of a bankruptcy filing increased among high-severity drivers,
relative to low-severity drivers, immediately after the crash. This strategy would be similar
to the approach taken in prior studies, including Himmelstein et al. (2010), Fay et al. (2002),
and Domowitz and Sartain (1999).
Table II suggests what we would find if we pursued this strategy. This table computes
the average bankruptcy filing rate during the three years following a crash among (i) drivers
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who were admitted to an emergency room after the crash (“EDAdmit”) and (ii) drivers who
did not seek medical care after a crash (“Not EDAdmit”). We observe a substantial di↵erence
between the two groups: Without distinguishing at-fault from not at-fault drivers, the filing
rate for the EDAdmit group is over two percentage points larger—forty-five percent larger—
than the rate among drivers who did not seek medical care. Restricting to at-fault drivers,
the di↵erence is comparably large (a thirty-two percent di↵erence).
The comparison in Table II, however, could overstate the causal e↵ect of health shocks
on bankruptcy if unobservable driver characteristics are correlated with our measure of crash
severity and with the probability of a bankruptcy filing.6 Financially unstable drivers may
be more prone to su↵er severe accidents, perhaps due to unobservable characteristics that
increase the risk of both financial and health shocks. Financially fragile individuals may also
be risky drivers.
Table III provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that crash severity and
financial conditions are jointly determined. We compute annual bankruptcy filings rate for
EDAdmit and Not EDAdmit drivers during the three years before and after their crashes. We
observe a substantial gap in pre-crash filing rates: bankruptcy filing rates among EDAdmit
drivers are thirty to fifty percent higher than Not EDAdmit rates in every pre-crash year,
regardless of whether the driver was judged to be at-fault for the crash. This is strong
evidence that crash severity is correlated with the background financial characteristics of
drivers, implying that a household’s exposure to this kind of shock (car crash) is endogenous
to the household’s underlying characteristics.
6Table II could also understate the e↵ects of health shocks because, in our data, severity is measured
using data gathered at an emergency room. Financially unstable drivers may be less likely to seek medical
care after an accident, perhaps because they are less likely to carry health insurance. If so, our measure of
crash severity (EDAdmit in Table II) will tend to exclude drivers who are the most financially unstable. We
assess this bias in Table XV of the Appendix, which presents the insurance status of EDAdmit drivers with
di↵erent injury severity levels. Even if uninsured drivers generally prefer to avoid emergency room care, their
insurance status is less likely to deter them from seeking care after highly severe injuries. Thus, if Table II is
biased, we should observe that uninsured drivers represent a higher proportion of high-severity injuries than
of low-severity injuries. Table XV assess this claim using two di↵erent metrics of injury severity. One, in
Panel A, measures severity using the total expenditure reported by the hospital. Panel A divides this
expenditure into quintiles. Panel B measures severity using reports filed by police at the scene of the crash.
Together these panels o↵er little evidence of a systematic tendency of uninsured drivers to avoid emergency
room treatment. Panel A shows that uninsured drivers are most represented in the lowest and highest
quintiles. Panel B is similar, with higher proportions of uninsured drivers at the lowest and highest severity
classifications.
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This finding points to behavioral consistency : In our data, drivers exhibit heteroge-
neous background risk levels which generate a correlation between their financial condition
and driving outcomes. Additional evidence of behavioral consistency can be seen in Table
IV, which identifies several categories of risky driving behavior: reckless or at-fault driving
(as determined by tra c police), driving the wrong way down a road (Wrong Way), driving
under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI), driving under the influence of drugs (Drugs),
speeding, and driving without a seat belt. For each category, we compute the bankruptcy
filing rate during the three years prior to the crash for drivers who engaged in the risky
driving behavior and for drivers who did not. In all but one category (Wrong Way), we
observe higher pre-crash bankruptcy rates among drivers who engaged in risky driving. For
some categories, the di↵erence is substantial. Reckless drivers, for example, exhibit pre-crash
bankruptcy rates (7.43%) over seventy-five percent larger than drivers who were not cited for
reckless driving (4.24%). Similarly, drivers who used drugs prior to a crash had a pre-crash
filing rate (9.15%) over one hundred percent higher than those who did not (4.25%).
These di↵erences persist in regression models predicting the probability of a bankruptcy
filing prior to a crash. They also persist when we compare bankruptcy filing rates more than
three years prior to the crash. For example, for each crash year, we identified drivers who ex-
perienced crashes with at least one of the risk factors listed in Table IV (“risky crashes”) and
drivers whose crashes exhibited none of those factors (“non-risky crashes”). In unreported
tables, we compute the average annual bankruptcy filing rate for the two groups during the
three to six years, six to nine years, and nine to twelve years prior to the crash. During
each of these lookback periods, we find that drivers in risky crashes exhibit a higher filing
rate than those in non-risky crashes, though the di↵erence diminishes as we look farther into
the past. During the three to six years prior to the crash, we observe an eighteen percent
di↵erence in fling rates, but during the nine to twelve years before the crash we observe a ten
percent di↵erence.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The existence of behavioral consistency suggests that a driver’s crash risk depends on
his or her pre-existing financial condition. This presents a bias in tests that seek to discover
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the causal role of car accidents. To the extent that financially stressed households have higher
crash risk, the bankruptcy filing rate of drivers who experience severe crashes will be higher
than the rate of drivers who experience minor (or no) crashes purely for selection reasons
unrelated to the crash itself.
To address this bias observed in our data, we propose a novel di↵erence-in-di↵erence
(DD) strategy that exploits di↵erences in the timing of crashes experienced by observationally
similar drivers. Some drivers experience crashes earlier in our data than others. Assuming
the precise timing of a crash is uncorrelated with the driver’s pre-crash financial condition,
we can treat drivers with later crashes as a control group for drivers with earlier crashes.
In particular, we match drivers who su↵ered a crash in year t (treatment group) to drivers
who su↵ered a crash of comparable severity in year t+n (control group). For each driver in
the control group, we create a “placebo” crash date, equal to their actual crash date minus
n years. We then compare the bankruptcy behavior of treatment and control group around
year t. Specifically, we study the n years before and after year t. During this period, drivers
in the treatment group experienced a crash, but drivers in the control group did not. More
formally, our estimator computes the increase in bankruptcy filing rates during the period
[t n, t+n) among treatment group drivers relative to control group drivers. Figure I provides
an illustration of our basic identification strategy.
This di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy allows us to estimate whether high severity
crashes—which generate substantial medical expenditures among drivers who are highly un-
likely to refuse medical care—cause an increase in the bankruptcy filing rate of drivers who
su↵ered such crashes in period t, relative to drivers who su↵ered comparable high severity
crashes later in time t+ n.
By conditioning on the treatment variable, our empirical strategy allows for the pos-
sibility that exposure to car accident risk, in particular to high-severity car accident risk,
is correlated with household financial characteristics. Instead, our identifying assumption is
that, conditional on having a crash, a driver’s pre-crash financial condition is uncorrelated
with the timing of his or her crash. Put di↵erently, during period t, the same financial char-
acteristics are shared by drivers who su↵ered crashes in period t and by drivers who su↵ered
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similar crashes in period t + n. This assumption is more plausible when n is small. In our
estimates below, we let n equal 1 year or 3 years. We also confirm that the pre-t character-
istics of treatment and control drivers are comparable regardless of whether we let n equal 1
year or 3 years.
The principal advantage of our approach is that it addresses the potential endogeneity
of crash severity and underlying financial status. Financially unstable drivers may have a
relatively high probability of su↵ering severe crashes and a relatively low probability of seeking
medical attention. Although we cannot observe a driver’s pre-crash financial characteristics,
drivers who su↵er high severity (or low severity) crashes may share similar characteristics.
As long as these characteristics are time-invariant over at least short periods (say, x years),
drivers who su↵er crashes in year t likely share the same financial characteristics as those
who su↵er comparable crashes in year t+ x.
This empirical strategy requires additional restrictions to our sample data. Although
we have information on all crashes during 1992–2005, complete data on hospital-related
variables is available beginning 1996. We therefore include in the Treatment Group all crashes
that occurred during 1999–2002 (we stop at 2002 because we need to verify that drivers with
crashes during 2002 had no additional crashes during the subsequent three years). The
Control Group includes crashes that occurred during 2002–2005. 7 This allows us to observe
three years of bankruptcy behavior before and after each crash.8
2.5 Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups
Table V presents summary statistics for drivers who su↵ered crashes in year t (the
treatment group) and for those who su↵ered crashes in year t+3 (the control group). Statistics
that vary with time (e.g., driver and car age, whether a bankruptcy was filed in the preceding
three years) are measured at time t for all drivers. Crash-specific variables (e.g., fault,
EDAdmit, and insurance status) are measured at the time of the crash—t for the treatment
7Crashes are sometimes included twice: once as a treatment crash, and again as a control crash. When
this occurs, the bankruptcy filing probability is computed over di↵erent time intervals for the two
observations: it is computed relative to the actual treatment date when the crash enters the Treatment
Group; it is computed relative to the placebo treatment date when the crash enters the Control Group
8We similarly construct a sample in which n = 1. The Treatment Group for that sample consists of
crashes during 1997–2004, and the Control Group consists of crashes during 1998–2005.
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group and t + 3 for the controls. As noted above, our strategy assumes that these crash-
specific variables are correlated with time-invariant, unobservable background characteristics
of the drivers. This intuition is supported by Table III, which showed a strong correlation
between crash severity and pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates, suggesting that unobservable
characteristics are an important driver of both crashes and bankruptcies.
Table V shows that treatment and control drivers are closely comparable across a
broad range of observable characteristics, including driver age and gender and most crash-
related variables. There are, however, potentially important di↵erences in car age (“New
Car”) and between the two groups’ pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates (listed under Bankruptcy
Data). The di↵erence in car age is an artifact of our identification strategy: Among drivers in
the control group, we take car age at the actual crash date, t+3, and subtracting 3 to impute
car age at “treatment” date t. This assumes that the driver owned the same car during the
past three years. If a driver’s car age at t + 3 is less than or equal to 3, we cannot impute
car age at t. We could code car age as missing at t (reflecting the lack of information about
car age at that date) or treat the driver as having a new car at t (thereby taking advantage
of the information that the driver purchased a new car at t+ 3). Because our analysis is the
same regardless of the approach, Table V treats a placebo driver as having a new car at t if
the driver had a new car at t+ 3.
The di↵erences in pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates likely reflect immigration patterns.
When we compute the bankruptcy rate during the years preceding t, we are implicitly as-
suming that the drivers lived in Utah during these years and, therefore, that any bankruptcy
filing would have been filed in a Utah court. If a driver did not live in Utah during this period
and filed for bankruptcy in a non-Utah court, information about this filing is not included
in our database. This bias is more important for drivers in the Control Group because we
are measuring the bankruptcy filing rate during the three years prior to their placebo crash,
which is equivalent to measuring the rate during the six years prior to their actual crash.
The immigration hypothesis is supported by Table VI, which compares drivers who
su↵ered crashes in year t (treatment group) to those who su↵ered crashes in t+1. Here, there
is a much smaller gap in time between the actual crash dates of treatment and control drivers.
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In any event, we do not believe that immigration-induced di↵erences present a potential
confound in our empirical analysis below. As reported below, our results are largely the same
whether we use a control group that su↵ered crashes in t+ 1 or in t+ 3.
2.6 Econometric Specification
We estimate a panel probit specification of the following form:
Pr(Bit = 1) =  (↵+   · Crashi + µ 3 ·Year 3 + µ 2 ·Year 2 +
µ1 ·Year1 + µ2 ·Year2 + µ3 ·Year3 +
  3 · Crashi ·Year 3 +   2 · Crashi ·Year 2 +
 1 · Crashi ·Year1 +  2 · Crashi ·Year2 +  3 · Crashi ·Year3 +
  ·Xit)
The dependent variable (Bit = 1) is a dummy equal to one if driver i files for bankruptcy
during year t. We estimate this probability for each year t 2 {-3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3} preceding and
following the date of an actual crash (for the treatment group) or a placebo crash (for the con-
trol group). If a driver files for bankruptcy in year t, the driver drops out of our analysis until
he or she is legally eligible to file for bankruptcy again (the law at this time prevented a driver
from filing for bankruptcy during the eight years after receiving a bankruptcy discharge).9
Crashi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if driver i is a member of the treatment
group. The variables Yeart are time dummies that identify each year t 2 {-3, -2, -1, 1, 2,
3} preceding and following the actual or placebo crash. The excluded category is Year-1, the
twelve months immediately preceding the actual or placebo crash. Thus, each year dummy
Yeart measures the di↵erence between (i) the average bankruptcy probability in year t and
the (ii) the average in year t =  1. We define this di↵erence as the “change in bankruptcy
filing rates in year t.” We interact these Yeart time dummies with the treatment indicator
9We verified whether the driver obtained a discharge after filing for bankruptcy. If the driver did not
receive a discharge (perhaps because the case was dismissed prior to discharge), the driver remained in our
analysis because he or she was still eligible for bankruptcy relief. Our results, however, are not sensitive to
how we treat this legal issue. We obtain similar results whether drivers remain in our sample or drop out
after receiving a discharge.
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Crashi. Each interaction is a di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator, measuring the di↵erence be-
tween treatment and control drivers with respect to the change in bankruptcy filing rates in
year t. The coe cients of interest are { 1,  2,  3}, which measure the di↵erence-in-di↵erence
estimators during the years immediately following the (actual or placebo) crash. Coe cients
for the other interactions { -3,  -2} identify time-varying pre-crash di↵erences between the
treatment and control group drivers.
Finally, Xit is a vector of driver, car, and crash characteristics, including driver age
and gender, car age, and whether the driver su↵ered crashes or filed for bankruptcy prior to
the actual or placebo crash. Standard errors are clustered by driver.
This specification is analogous to a discrete-time hazard model, similar to the models
estimated in Grogger and Bronars (2001) and DeCicca, et al. (2002). It is well-known that
nonlinear models like the one proposed here are vulnerable to important biases. Greene
(2004) catalogues some of the problems. We have verified that the results reported below
are qualitatively the same when we apply a linear probability model and a conditional (fixed
e↵ects) logit model.
3 Results
3.1 Univariate Comparisons
Figure II plots bankruptcy filing rates for treatment and control drivers during the
three years before and after the crash date, which is defined as the actual crash date for
treatment group drivers and the placebo crash date for control group drivers. The placebo
crash date here is defined as the date three years before the actual crash date of the control
group drivers. Looking across all crashes, Plot (a) shows no meaningful di↵erence between
treatment and control filing rates before or after the crash date. This is unsurprising because
the vast majority crashes caused minor injuries to property (fender benders). The subsequent
plots, therefore, subset on crashes with relatively high severity levels and on drivers who may
be more financially fragile.
Plot (b) subsets on crashes that were immediately followed by emergency room visits
(EDAdmit Crashes). The pattern here is largely the same, with no apparent e↵ect of crashes
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on the relative filing rate of treatment group drivers. Plot (b), however, may be biased
against observing an e↵ect of a crash. This is true for two reasons. First, drivers can choose
whether to visit an emergency room, especially when their injuries are minor. If financially
unstable drivers are less likely to seek emergency room care, the patterns in Plot (b) will be
biased against finding an e↵ect. The treatment group will be weighted toward drivers who
are financially stable and unlikely to file for bankruptcy in response to a shock. Additionally,
many emergency room treatments are for minor injuries, such as cuts and bruises, which are
unlikely to generate su ciently large medical bills that they could cause financial instability
and bankruptcy.
Plot (c) addresses this issue by subsetting on crashes with two characteristics: (i) the
driver subsequently visited an emergency room and (ii) the driver incurred hospital charges
that ranked among the top twenty-five percent of all charges in our dataset (High Charge
Crashes). The mean charge for these drivers is $12,971 (in 2012 dollars), the minimum is
$1,663, and the maximum $709,875.10 We think it is plausible to assume that virtually all
drivers who su↵er injuries of such magnitude will visit an emergency room. The magnitude
may also be large enough to trigger a bankruptcy filing. Among these drivers, Plot (c) in
Figure 2 shows largely parallel filing rates of treatment and control drivers, before and after
the treatment date, again suggesting no e↵ect of crashes on filing rates.
Because some drivers in Plot (c) had charges as low as $1,663, Plot (d) subsets on
High Charge crashes in which the driver incurred at least $5,000 in hospital charges. This
number was chosen because Utah law requires all drivers to carry Personal Injury Protection
insurance equal to $3,000. We selected a number substantially larger than that minimum in
order to isolate injuries that could destabilize financially fragile households. Here we see the
di↵erence between treatment and controls widen slightly during the year before the crash and
during the second year after. But the post-crash increase in the treatment groups filing rate
(relative to the controls) declines in the third year, suggesting that the post-crash variation
may be attributable to random variation.
Finally, Plots (e) and (f) subset on EDAdmit and High Charge crashes among unin-
sured drivers, who are likely more financially fragile than the average driver. There are two
10Results are the same when we subset on the top ten percent (with a mean charge of $21,333), but the
sample size is substantially smaller.
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limitations to this analysis. First, we observe health insurance status only for drivers who visit
an emergency room after a crash. Second, the sample sizes here are relatively small. Among
High Charge crashes, for example, we observe only about 550 crashes and 13 bankruptcy
filings on average per year involving uninsured drivers. In both plots, we observe pre- and
post-crash increases of treatment group drivers, relative to controls. The post-crash increases
appear in the second year, but largely disappear in the third.
Figure III presents the same plots, but focuses on the four quarters before and after
the crash date. In these plots, the placebo date for control group drivers is the date one year
before their actual crash date. Plots (a) and (b) show no increase in the treatment group
filing rate, relative to controls, in the full sample or among EDAdmit crashes. Among High
Charge crashes—Plots (c) and (d)—we observe pre- and post-crash increases in the relative
filing rate of the treatment group, with the post-crash increase rising temporarily in the
third quarter. Among uninsured drivers, there is no apparent increase in treatment group
filing rates among EDAdmit crashes in Panel (e). Panel (f) may show a post-crash relative
increase among High Charge crashes, but the di↵erence between treatment and controls varies
substantially by quarter. Figures IV and V present the same plots, but subset on at-fault
drivers. Again, there is no apparent increase in the filing rate of treatment group drivers,
relative to controls, after the crash date. Instead, the post-crash di↵erence tends to narrow
in most plots.
Together, these figures suggest that crashes may not have a sizable e↵ect on bankruptcy
filing rates, regardless of crash severity. The patterns for uninsured drivers, however, are
largely inconclusive due to small sample sizes.
3.2 Baseline Estimates
Tables VII and VIII implement our empirical specification for the one-year and three-
year splits, respectively. Each table reports marginal e↵ects from a panel probit model.11 The
marginal e↵ects can be compared to the bankruptcy filing rate during the period immediately
11Marginal e↵ects are obtained from Stata’s dprobit routine. Because we are estimating DD e↵ects, we do
not make the adjustments recommended by Ai and Norton (2003). See Kremer and Snyder (2010) and
Puhani (2008).
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preceding the crash, as reported at the bottom of the tables (“Ref. Bankruptcy Probability”).
Standard errors are clustered by driver.
We view Tables VII and VIII as estimates of short-term and longer-run impacts of
crashes. In each table, Columns (1) and (2) estimate the e↵ects of crashes, regardless of
severity, on the probability of a bankruptcy filing. We include a minimal set of controls
in Column (1): time dummies, the crash dummy, interactions between the time and crash
dummies, and county and calendar year fixed e↵ects. Column (2) adds driver-specific controls,
including car age, driver age and gender, and the prior bankruptcy and crash history of the
driver (the coe cients for these controls are reported in the Appendix, Tables XVI and
XVII). The coe cients of interest are the interactions “Year t After Crash ⇥ Crash” in
Table VII and “Quarter t After Crash ⇥ Crash” in Table VIII. These coe cients measure
the change in bankruptcy filing rate among treatment group drivers, relative to controls,
during period t relative to the period immediately preceding the crash. In Column (1) of
Table VII, for example, the coe cient for “Year 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash” equals 0.000025.
This indicates that the di↵erence between treatment and controls was larger during the
first quarter following the crash than during the quarter immediately before (Year -1 is the
omitted category).12 The increase, however, is very small relative to the filing rate among
treatment group drivers during the year prior to the crash. This rate is given by the row
“Ref. Bankruptcy Probability” and is equal to .016 in Column (1). Thus, the .000025
percentage point relative increase during the first year following the crash represents a 0.16%
increase relative to the pre-crash filing rate among treatment group drivers. The e↵ect is also
insignificant.
Across Columns (1) and (2) of Tables VII and VIII, we observe no significant increase
in the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers during the post-crash period.
Many coe cients are negative and significant. These non-results are unsurprising, as noted
above, because most crashes are fender-benders and therefore unlikely to impact bankruptcy
filing rates. On the other hand, Columns (1) and (2) indicate that treatment and control
group drivers exhibited di↵erent bankruptcy filing rates prior to the treatment date. Several
12We also find comparable results when we let the number of years between the control and treatment
groups n equal 5.
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of the “Quarter t Before Crash ⇥ Crash” coe cients are negative and significant (or nearly
so). This raises the possibility that unobservable di↵erences between the two groups may be
confounding our estimates.
The remaining columns in Tables VII and VIII subset on drivers who su↵ered suf-
ficiently serious injuries that an e↵ect on bankruptcy filing rates is plausible. Columns (3)
and (4) subset on EDAdmit drivers; Columns (6) and (7) subset on High Charge drivers.
For each group, the first column includes minimal controls; the second column adds driver-
specific controls. Although an e↵ect on bankruptcy is plausible, the results here are similar
to those reported in the previous columns. We observe no statistically significant, positive
impact of crashes on treatment group bankruptcy rates, relative to controls, during the first
three years (Table VII) or first four quarters (Table VIII) following the crash. Even when
the coe cient is positive, the coe cient is small relative to the pre-crash filing rate, reported
at the bottom of the table (“Ref. Bankruptcy Probability”). Additionally, we observe no
evidence of pre-trends in either Table VII or VIII.
Finally Columns (5) and (8) subset on EDAdmit and High Charge drivers who did
not have health insurance (private or public) when they received treatment. For these drivers,
high hospital charges could be financially destabilizing. Yet the results in Tables VII and
VIII suggest otherwise. We continue to observe no post-crash increase in the relative filing
rate of treatment group drivers. We do observe a pre-trend in in Table VIII. Treatment group
drivers had a substantially higher bankruptcy filing rate, relative to the control group, during
the year before the crash. We caution, however, that the sample size here is small.
Tables IX and X rerun these regressions, but subset on drivers who were at-fault.
Recall that these drivers have access to less insurance than not at-fault drivers (who can
bring suit against at-fault drivers). The results are largely the same, showing no persistent or
sizable di↵erence between treatment and control drivers during the quarters or years following
a crash (Appendix Tables XVIII and XIX report estimates for the remaining controls).13 Here
13The foregoing tables assume that drivers have identical propensities to file for bankruptcy, conditional
upon crash severity and other observables. In unreported regressions, we relax this assumption by employing
a fixed-e↵ect version of our empirical specification. Due to the incidental parameters problem, discussed in
Greene (2004), we estimate a conditional logit model instead of a fixed e↵ects probit. We obtain largely the
same results, although our estimates are less stable due to small sample sizes.
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(and below), we omit regressions that subset on uninsured drivers with High Charge crashes
due to small sample sizes.
Across all specifications, then, we observe no statistically significant or persistent
relationship between crashes and post-crash bankruptcy filing rates. The magnitudes of the
coe cients are small and often negative. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis
that households are financially fragile and that unexpected shocks can induce bankruptcy
filings.
3.3 Extensions
Although we find no e↵ect of severe crashes on bankruptcy filing rates, our analysis
thus far may conceal important heterogeneity across drivers. Our data, for example, do not
include information about income, debt burdens, and other driver characteristics correlated
with financial fragility. Perhaps we would find an e↵ect of crashes on bankruptcy filing rates
if we identified drivers who were particularly financially fragile. We attempt to do this in the
remaining tables.
Tables XI and XII rerun our regressions on subsets of at-fault drivers who may be
more or less fragile than the average driver. Throughout these tables we subset on drivers
who experienced crashes that resulted in emergency room visits (EDAdmit drivers).14 Col-
umn (1) in each table subsets on drivers whose car was relatively new at the time of the
crash (purchased within the prior three years). Because many new cars are purchased with
loans, these drivers may have higher debt levels and therefore be more financially fragile.
Additionally, crashes tend to cause more expensive property damage for drivers with newer
cars. This means, of course, that the coe cients in Column (1) will reflect the impact of
both health trauma as well as expensive property damage. Column (2) uses the same sample
as Column (1), but subsets further on drivers did not carry health insurance. Across both
tables, we observe no significant increase in the relative filing rate of treatment group drivers.
Although the coe cients of interest are often positive, particularly in Column (1), they are
highly statistically insignificant.
14We obtain similar results when we run our analysis on the full sample of drivers.
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Columns (3) and (4) subset on drivers between ages 35 and 45 at the treatment date
(i.e., the crash date for treatment group drivers and placebo date for controls). Individuals
in this age range tend to have the highest bankruptcy filing rates, due to indebtedness (for
houses and cars) and family expenses. Across both columns in all tables, we observe no e↵ect
of crashes on the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers.
Columns (5) and (6) subset on drivers who lived in zip codes with relatively low mean
household income (defined as zip codes in the bottom 25% of the income distribution across
Utah zip codes). Here too we observe no e↵ect of crashes on bankruptcy filing rates.
Finally, Tables XIII and XIV rerun our regressions on the subset of at-fault drivers
who experienced a crash while traveling with an underage child. We hypothesize that a
driver’s financial fragility may be higher when a child is a passenger. The driver is likely to
be a parent of the passenger and parents tend to be financially fragile due to the expenses of
childrearing. Additionally, the crash may injure the child as well as the driver. If the driver
is financially responsible for the child, the child’s injuries will increase the magnitude of the
“shock” caused by the crash. Across all specifications, however, we observe no post-crash
increase in the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers. Note that some
specifications subset on drivers with new cars. We observe no e↵ect of crashes among these
drivers.15
Together, these results suggest that severe automobile crashes generally do not desta-
bilize drivers.
4 Conclusion
We find evidence that automobile crashes are endogenous to the driver’s financial
condition. Severe crashes and crashes exhibiting risk factors (such as driving under the
influence) are more likely to involve drivers with a relatively high pre-existing propensity to
file for bankruptcy. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that adverse shocks, such as
car accidents, are not exogenous shocks. Instead, we appear to observe a form of behavior
consistency: there is a positive correlation between a household’s probability of experiencing
15We obtain similar results when we run our analysis on the full sample of drivers.
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a health shock and the household’s pre-shock financial condition. Failure to account for this
correlation results in an upward bias in causal estimates of the impact of adverse health
shocks on bankruptcy filing rates.
We address this endogeneity by developing a di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy that
attempts to isolate unobservable background characteristics driving both accident and finan-
cial risk. We compare drivers who su↵ered comparable crashes at di↵erent points in time.
Assuming that unobservable background characteristics are persistent, we allow for the pos-
sibility that drivers who experience more severe accidents may di↵er in important ways, so
long as the timing of their crash, conditional on having a crash, is unrelated to household
characteristics. We view the di↵erence in crash timing as a treatment e↵ect separating a
treatment group (who su↵ered a crash in year t) from a control group (who su↵ered no crash
in year t, but did su↵er one in year t+3). We emphasize that our empirical approach can be
broadly applied in a variety of contexts in which selection into treatment is a concern, but in
which the precise timing of the treatment is more plausibly exogenous.
Applying this strategy, we find no causal e↵ect of car accidents on bankruptcy filing
rates, either economically or statistically. All of the variation in bankruptcy filing rates across
individuals is explained by cross-sectional heterogeneous ex ante exposure to risk; none of
the variation in bankruptcy filing rates is explained by exposure to the health shock. This
result holds true even for individuals in our sample who face high levels of uninsured medical
bills, although our estimates are imprecise due to small sample sizes. Our interpretation is
that the households in our sample are insured in the sense of being able to avoid bankruptcy
filings for the shocks investigated in our paper.
Our findings are qualified by several limitations of our research design. First, car
crashes may not be informative about genuinely large financial shocks. Among drivers who
visited the emergency room, the mean charge was about $10,000. While this is a substantial
amount relative to both the typical household shock and median household income, more
severe shocks could elevate bankruptcy filing rates. Additionally, our data are drawn from
a single geographic area (Utah) with distinctive socioeconomic characteristics. We are also
studying a particular, extreme response to health shocks—bankruptcy—but households may
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respond to these shocks in other ways, such as by reducing consumption or defaulting on
debts without filing for bankruptcy. We are examining these three limitations in follow-on
work studying cancer patients.
A more important limitation is that we cannot rule out reverse causation. Persistent
financial distress may be a cause of risk-taking behavior, such as risky driving. To the extent
that distressed households tend to be judgment-proof, they do not fully internalize the costs
of their driving behavior.
Finally, we cannot rule out the importance of strategic behavior. Although we find
that persistent household characteristics are more important than adverse events as deter-
minants of consumer bankruptcy filings,16 it remains unclear how households determine the
optimal timing of filings. It is possible that households strategically time their filings to
obtain the largest possible benefit, as in Fay et al. (2002).
With these limitations in mind, we believe that our findings cast doubt on a wide
range of studies arguing that shocks are driver of household distress. We are unaware of any
study that addresses the potential endogeneity of shocks and household financial condition,
which generates an upward bias in prior estimates. Our empirical strategy provides a new,
useful way to address this endogeneity.
16This may help explain the phenomenon, reported by Porter and Thorne (2006), that a significant
proportion of bankruptcy filers continue to su↵er financial instability after obtaining a bankruptcy discharge.
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FIGURE I
Illustration of Difference-in-Difference Identification Strategy
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Notes. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence e↵ect is computed as the change in bankruptcy rates between [t, t+n) (the
“post-treatment window”) and [t n, t) (the “pre-treatment window”) among drivers in the Treatment Group
relative to the change in bankruptcy between [t, t+n) and [t n, t) among drivers in the Control Group. Both
the Treatment and Control Groups are selected from a population experiencing a crash. For the Treatment
Group, date t is the actual date of a car crash. For the Control Group, date t is n periods prior to the actual
crash date, thereby excluding the date of the actual crash from the sample interval.
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FIGURE II
Annual Hazard of Bankruptcy Filing, Three Year Split
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Notes. These plots show the di↵erence in bankruptcy filing rates between treatment and control group crashes.
Drivers in the treatment group su↵ered a crash at time 0; drivers in the control group su↵ered a crash three
years after this date. Plot (a) shows results for all drivers, Plot (b) subsets (for both treatment and controls)
on drivers who visited the hospital after their crash. Plot (c) subsets on crashes with charges in the top 25
percent of all charges in our dataset. Plot (d) subsets on crashes in which the driver’s hospital charges totaled
at least $5,000. Plot (e) subsets on crashes involving drivers who visited the emergency room and carried no
health insurance. Plot (f) subsets on crashes involving drivers who visited the emergency room, carried no
health insurance, and incurred charges in the top 25 percent of charges in our dataset.
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FIGURE III
Quarterly Hazard of Bankruptcy Filing, One Year Split
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(f) High Charge Crashes, Uninsured
Notes. These plots show the di↵erence in bankruptcy filing rates between treatment and control group crashes.
Drivers in the treatment group su↵ered a crash at time 0; drivers in the control group su↵ered a crash a year
after this date. Plot (a) shows results for all drivers, Plot (b) subsets (for both treatment and controls) on
drivers who visited the hospital after their crash. Plot (c) subsets on crashes with charges in the top 25 percent
of all charges in our dataset. Plot (d) subsets on crashes in which the driver’s hospital charges totaled at least
$5,000. Plot (e) subsets on crashes involving drivers who visited the emergency room and carried no health
insurance. Plot (f) subsets on crashes involving drivers who visited the emergency room, carried no health
insurance, and incurred charges in the top 25 percent of charges in our dataset.
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TABLE I
Average Bankruptcy Filing Rate by Year by Group.
All At Fault Utah Average, Age 18+
N Rate (%) N Rate (%) Rate (%)
1992 33303 1.01 11639 1.07 0.91
1993 35109 .86 12710 .95 0.73
1994 34034 .78 12024 .85 0.67
1995 31120 .82 10570 .94 0.72
1996 31920 1.02 10927 1.11 0.91
1997 30072 1.33 10460 1.34 1.16
1998 28136 1.55 9730 1.6 1.33
1999 25751 1.59 8754 1.72 1.31
2000 24508 1.69 8345 1.77 1.39
2001 23168 2.05 7714 2.12 1.73
2002 21929 2.31 7407 2.38 1.93
2003 20786 2.27 6901 2.32 1.87
2004 21668 2.1 7228 2.11 1.70
2005 20060 2.11 6694 2.19 1.70
Notes. Count (N) reports the number of crashes during the relevant year for
all drivers and for at-fault drivers. Bankruptcy rate (Rate(%)) indicates the
bankruptcy filing rate among drivers who experienced a crash during the rele-
vant year. The rate is reported for all drivers and for at-fault drivers. Counts
and Bankruptcy Rates are calculated using the subsample of drivers who were
between ages 25 and 55 during the study period. Fault status is determined by
police-assessed crash report.
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TABLE II
Bankruptcy Filing Rate by
Medical Status During Three
Years Following Crash.
All At Fault
Not EDAdmit .053 .063
EDAdmit .077 .083
Notes. This table reports bankruptcy rates
during the three years following a crash among
drivers aged 25 to 55. Bankruptcy rates
are reported by crash severity (Not EDAd-
mit, EDAdmit, Both) and by Fault (All, At
Fault). EDAdmit refers to drivers admitted
to an emergency room following a crash.
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TABLE III
Annual Bankruptcy Filing Rate, Before and After Crash.
Years Relative to Crash -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
Panel A: Not at Fault
- Not EDAdmit 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.019
- EDAdmit 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.026
Panel B: At Fault
- Not EDAdmit 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.0193
- EDAdmit 0.019 0.020 0.026 0.028 0.023 0.027
Notes. This table reports the annual bankruptcy filing rate, during the three years
before and after a crash, by injury severity and fault. EDAdmit refers to crashes in
which the driver was admitted to an emergency room. Fault status is determined by
the police-assessed crash report. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All drivers
are aged 25–55.
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TABLE IV
Prior Three Year Bankruptcy
Rate by Dangerous Driving Status.
No Yes
(%) (%)
Violations
- Reckless Driving 4.24 7.43
- Wrong Way 4.25 4.20
At Fault
- At Fault 4.09 4.55
DUI
- DUI 4.22 5.39
- Drugs 4.25 9.15
Speeding
- Speeding 5 Above 4.24 5.22
- Speeding 10 Above 4.24 5.11
Seatbelt
- No Seatbelt 4.13 4.89
Notes. This table reports the probability of a
bankruptcy filing during the three years prior
to the crash. Bankruptcy rates are calculated
separately for crashes with di↵erent proxies for
risky driving. The proves are derived from po-
lice assessments taken shortly after the crash.
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TABLE XVI
3 Year Sample Panel, All Crashes
(1)-All (2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge High Charge Uninsured
Year 3 Before Crash (d) -0.0032⇤⇤ -0.0033⇤⇤ -0.0033⇤ -0.0033⇤⇤ 0.0067 -0.0029 -0.0031 0.045
(-8.97) (-9.42) (-2.55) (-2.59) (0.86) (-1.13) (-1.22) (1.43)
Year 2 Before Crash (d) -0.0019⇤⇤ -0.0020⇤⇤ -0.0036⇤⇤ -0.0036⇤⇤ 0.0073 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.043
(-5.22) (-5.52) (-2.86) (-2.90) (0.92) (-0.66) (-0.69) (1.40)
Year 1 After Crash (d) 0.0020⇤⇤ 0.0021⇤⇤ 0.0029⇤ 0.0029⇤ 0.0060 0.0030 0.0032 0.028
(4.89) (5.12) (1.98) (2.04) (0.76) (1.04) (1.12) (1.06)
Year 2 After Crash (d) 0.0035⇤⇤ 0.0037⇤⇤ 0.0057⇤⇤ 0.0059⇤⇤ 0.0069 0.0068⇤ 0.0074⇤ 0.029
(8.06) (8.64) (3.70) (3.87) (0.85) (2.21) (2.39) (1.07)
Year 3 After Crash (d) 0.0056⇤⇤ 0.0059⇤⇤ 0.0093⇤⇤ 0.0097⇤⇤ 0.024⇤ 0.0084⇤⇤ 0.0093⇤⇤ 0.074
(12.23) (13.01) (5.68) (5.90) (2.36) (2.65) (2.87) (1.82)
Crash (d) 0.0022⇤⇤ 0.0015⇤⇤ 0.0031⇤ 0.0023 0.0093 0.0045 0.0042 0.026⇤
(6.00) (4.15) (2.39) (1.84) (1.72) (1.61) (1.50) (2.03)
Year 3 Before Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00047 -0.00037 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.013⇤ -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.022⇤⇤
(-0.89) (-0.71) (-1.79) (-1.74) (-2.46) (-0.61) (-0.63) (-4.38)
Year 2 Before Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00070 -0.00062 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0074 0.00088 0.00080 -0.021⇤⇤
(-1.34) (-1.21) (0.62) (0.66) (-1.17) (0.22) (0.20) (-4.36)
Year 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) 0.000025 0.000026 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0076 -0.00061 -0.00060 -0.013
(0.05) (0.05) (-0.94) (-0.93) (-1.18) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-1.35)
Year 2 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00059 -0.00062 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0067
(-1.18) (-1.28) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.50)
Year 3 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.0027⇤⇤ -0.0027⇤⇤ -0.0051⇤⇤ -0.0051⇤⇤ -0.014⇤⇤ -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.021⇤⇤
(-5.99) (-6.14) (-3.48) (-3.52) (-3.11) (-0.52) (-0.49) (-4.98)
New Car (d) -0.0027⇤⇤ -0.0022⇤⇤ -0.000087 -0.0038
(-17.55) (-4.08) (-0.07) (-0.86)
New Car Missing (d) 0.0013 0.0022 0.0067 0.017
(1.25) (0.65) (0.84) (0.45)
Driver Age 0.00095⇤⇤ 0.0018⇤⇤ 0.0016⇤⇤ 0.0061⇤
(11.87) (6.25) (2.63) (2.52)
Driver Age2 -0.000016⇤⇤ -0.000027⇤⇤ -0.000023⇤⇤ -0.000080⇤⇤
(-16.03) (-7.39) (-3.09) (-2.59)
Male (d) 0.0015⇤⇤ 0.0021⇤⇤ 0.0010 -0.013⇤
(10.02) (4.02) (0.94) (-2.46)
Crash in prior 3 years (d) 0.0055⇤⇤ 0.0072⇤⇤ 0.0069⇤⇤ 0.0062
(23.22) (8.76) (4.02) (0.94)
Two Prior Crashes (d) 0.010⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.0061 0.012
(16.30) (6.23) (1.65) (0.73)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of cases 2634443 2634443 300293 300293 18511 75170 75170 4374
Ref. Bankruptcy Probability 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023
F-Test for Future Periods 1.2e-09 4.7e-10 0.013 0.012 0.076 0.96 0.97 0.038
Marginal e↵ects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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TABLE XVII
1 Year Sample Panel, All Crashes
(1)-All (2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge High Charge Uninsured
Quarter 4 Before Crash (d) 0.000070 0.000018 0.000059 0.000016 -0.0032 -0.00069 -0.00069 -0.0029
(0.39) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (-1.70) (-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.58)
Quarter 3 Before Crash (d) 0.00039⇤ 0.00033 0.00047 0.00044 -0.0032 0.00062 0.00060 0.00021
(2.10) (1.85) (0.73) (0.70) (-1.68) (0.48) (0.47) (0.03)
Quarter 2 Before Crash (d) 0.00057⇤⇤ 0.00053⇤⇤ 0.00082 0.00078 0.0026 -0.00047 -0.00047 0.0086
(3.02) (2.89) (1.25) (1.21) (0.92) (-0.39) (-0.39) (0.86)
Quarter 1 After Crash (d) 0.00045⇤ 0.00037⇤ -0.000046 -0.00011 0.00045 -0.0022⇤ -0.0021⇤ 0.0097
(2.38) (2.06) (-0.07) (-0.18) (0.18) (-1.99) (-1.97) (0.92)
Quarter 2 After Crash (d) 0.00037⇤ 0.00033 0.00067 0.00062 0.0020 0.00062 0.00066 0.0086
(1.99) (1.81) (1.02) (0.96) (0.72) (0.48) (0.51) (0.86)
Quarter 3 After Crash (d) 0.00056⇤⇤ 0.00053⇤⇤ 0.00074 0.00070 0.0010 0.00042 0.00045 0.0036
(2.96) (2.84) (1.13) (1.08) (0.39) (0.33) (0.35) (0.46)
Quarter 4 After Crash (d) 0.00091⇤⇤ 0.00090⇤⇤ 0.0022⇤⇤ 0.0021⇤⇤ 0.0011 0.0017 0.0017 0.016
(4.64) (4.68) (3.01) (3.00) (0.42) (1.20) (1.22) (1.21)
Crash (d) 0.00065⇤⇤ 0.00055⇤⇤ 0.0014⇤ 0.0013⇤ -0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0050
(3.74) (3.27) (2.31) (2.17) (-0.46) (0.89) (0.84) (0.94)
Quarter 4 Before Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00017 -0.00017 -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0071 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0068
(-0.73) (-0.74) (-1.36) (-1.37) (1.15) (-0.68) (-0.69) (0.47)
Quarter 3 Before Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00048⇤ -0.00046⇤ -0.00093 -0.00093 0.0082 -0.00083 -0.00081 -0.00037
(-2.14) (-2.09) (-1.24) (-1.25) (1.27) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.05)
Quarter 2 Before Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00046⇤ -0.00045⇤ -0.00100 -0.00099 -0.00039 0.00055 0.00053 -0.0041
(-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.35) (-1.35) (-0.13) (0.30) (0.29) (-1.21)
Quarter 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00062⇤⇤ -0.00060⇤⇤ -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.000028 0.00013 0.000090 -0.0057⇤
(-2.78) (-2.78) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (-2.51)
Quarter 2 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00026 -0.00025 -0.0016⇤ -0.0016⇤ -0.0049⇤⇤ -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0072⇤⇤
(-1.11) (-1.11) (-2.37) (-2.39) (-3.01) (-1.44) (-1.46) (-4.97)
Quarter 3 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00017 -0.00016 -0.00073 -0.00070 0.00025 0.0011 0.0011 0.0023
(-0.74) (-0.71) (-0.94) (-0.92) (0.07) (0.59) (0.59) (0.26)
Quarter 4 After Crash ⇥ Crash (d) -0.00058⇤⇤ -0.00057⇤⇤ -0.0021⇤⇤ -0.0020⇤⇤ 0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0050
(-2.66) (-2.66) (-3.22) (-3.23) (0.54) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.96)
New Car (d) -0.00095⇤⇤ -0.00086⇤⇤ -0.00018 0.00066
(-15.93) (-4.07) (-0.40) (0.35)
New Car Missing (d) 0.00035 0.0019 0.0059 0.021
(0.87) (1.31) (1.57) (0.97)
Driver Age 0.00048⇤⇤ 0.00070⇤⇤ 0.00080⇤⇤ 0.0017
(13.87) (5.83) (3.14) (1.60)
Driver Age2 -0.0000075⇤⇤ -0.000010⇤⇤ -0.000011⇤⇤ -0.000023
(-16.77) (-6.60) (-3.49) (-1.68)
Male (d) 0.00056⇤⇤ 0.00063⇤⇤ 0.00010 -0.0024
(9.40) (3.02) (0.24) (-1.27)
Crash in prior 1 years (d) 0.0019⇤⇤ 0.0017⇤⇤ 0.0024⇤ -0.0022
(13.33) (3.70) (2.48) (-0.85)
Two Prior Crashes (d) 0.0038⇤⇤ 0.0051⇤ 0.0053 0.011
(5.94) (2.41) (1.33) (0.61)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of cases 5388419 5388419 614015 614015 37856 154484 154484 8622
Ref. Bankruptcy Probability 0.0054 0.0054 0.0081 0.0081 0.0067 0.0093 0.0093 0.0077
F-Test for Future Periods 0.029 0.029 0.046 0.044 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.10
Marginal e↵ects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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TABLE XVIII
3 Year Sample Panel, At-Fault Drivers
(1)-All (2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge
Year 3 Before Crash -0.0029⇤⇤ -0.0030⇤⇤ -0.0031 -0.0028 0.011 -0.00015 -0.000027
(-4.52) (-4.65) (-1.15) (-1.05) (0.57) (-0.03) (-0.00)
Year 2 Before Crash -0.0020⇤⇤ -0.0020⇤⇤ -0.0051 -0.0048 0.010 0.00022 0.00049
(-2.96) (-3.05) (-1.93) (-1.86) (0.55) (0.04) (0.09)
Year 1 After Crash 0.0033⇤⇤ 0.0033⇤⇤ 0.0067⇤ 0.0066⇤ 0.031 0.0037 0.0041
(4.29) (4.40) (2.06) (2.06) (1.28) (0.62) (0.68)
Year 2 After Crash 0.0037⇤⇤ 0.0039⇤⇤ 0.0050 0.0051 0.017 0.012 0.013
(4.81) (5.11) (1.59) (1.63) (0.80) (1.79) (1.87)
Year 3 After Crash 0.0062⇤⇤ 0.0065⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤ 0.046 0.018⇤ 0.019⇤
(7.54) (7.94) (3.44) (3.46) (1.61) (2.39) (2.51)
Crash 0.0028⇤⇤ 0.0020⇤⇤ 0.0066⇤ 0.0056⇤ 0.020 0.0084 0.0083
(4.22) (3.18) (2.57) (2.19) (1.76) (1.54) (1.53)
Year 3 Before Crash ⇥ Crash -0.00052 -0.00045 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.017 -0.0084 -0.0084
(-0.55) (-0.49) (-1.09) (-1.06) (-1.86) (-1.44) (-1.49)
Year 2 Before Crash ⇥ Crash -0.00061 -0.00056 0.00023 0.00017 -0.0099 0.0016 0.00075
(-0.65) (-0.61) (0.06) (0.05) (-0.81) (0.20) (0.10)
Year 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash -0.00045 -0.00041 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.018⇤ -0.000024 -0.00045
(-0.50) (-0.47) (-1.23) (-1.24) (-2.41) (-0.00) (-0.06)
Year 2 After Crash ⇥ Crash -0.00082 -0.00086 -0.0065⇤ -0.0065⇤ -0.013 -0.0093 -0.0093
(-0.94) (-1.01) (-2.21) (-2.27) (-1.26) (-1.79) (-1.83)
Year 3 After Crash ⇥ Crash -0.0030⇤⇤ -0.0030⇤⇤ -0.0079⇤⇤ -0.0079⇤⇤ -0.018⇤ -0.0094 -0.0095
(-3.86) (-3.90) (-2.97) (-3.06) (-2.52) (-1.85) (-1.92)
New Car -0.0024⇤⇤ -0.0026⇤ 0.00073
(-8.69) (-2.33) (0.33)
New Car Missing 0.0057⇤⇤ 0.014 0.079⇤
(2.75) (1.56) (1.99)
Driver Age 0.0011⇤⇤ 0.0029⇤⇤ 0.0031⇤⇤
(8.05) (5.10) (2.71)
Driver Age2 -0.000019⇤⇤ -0.000041⇤⇤ -0.000043⇤⇤
(-10.18) (-5.53) (-2.92)
Male 0.0018⇤⇤ 0.0011 0.0015
(7.04) (1.00) (0.70)
Crash in prior 3 years 0.0062⇤⇤ 0.0074⇤⇤ 0.0050
(14.91) (4.47) (1.59)
Two Prior Crashes 0.012⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤ 0.0076
(11.09) (3.97) (1.14)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of cases 891765 891765 73622 73622 4699 19789 19789
Ref. Bankruptcy Probability 0.017 0.017 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.026
F-Test for Future Periods 0.0012 0.00096 0.064 0.054 0.36 0.19 0.19
Marginal e↵ects; t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01
49
TABLE XIX
1 Year Sample Panel, At-Fault Drivers
(1)-All (2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge
Quarter 4 Before Crash -0.000051 -0.000083 -0.0024⇤ -0.0023⇤ -0.0091⇤⇤ -0.0029 -0.0028
(-0.16) (-0.27) (-2.27) (-2.20) (-3.50) (-1.53) (-1.48)
Quarter 3 Before Crash 0.000016 -0.000024 -0.00064 -0.00056 -0.0041 -0.00057 -0.00049
(0.05) (-0.08) (-0.55) (-0.48) (-1.11) (-0.26) (-0.22)
Quarter 2 Before Crash 0.00019 0.00017 -0.0024⇤ -0.0023⇤ -0.0091⇤⇤ -0.0038⇤ -0.0037⇤
(0.60) (0.55) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-3.56) (-2.14) (-2.09)
Quarter 1 After Crash 0.00023 0.00016 -0.00094 -0.00096 0.00030 -0.0045⇤⇤ -0.0044⇤⇤
(0.70) (0.52) (-0.81) (-0.84) (0.06) (-2.66) (-2.63)
Quarter 2 After Crash 0.00031 0.00027 0.00057 0.00052 0.0019 -0.00073 -0.00062
(0.96) (0.84) (0.44) (0.42) (0.36) (-0.33) (-0.28)
Quarter 3 After Crash 0.00044 0.00040 -0.00044 -0.00050 -0.0023 0.00036 0.00033
(1.34) (1.25) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.56) (0.15) (0.14)
Quarter 4 After Crash 0.00074⇤ 0.00072⇤ 0.0023 0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0024
(2.19) (2.17) (1.59) (1.55) (-0.48) (-1.25) (-1.21)
Crash 0.00045 0.00035 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0027
(1.46) (1.18) (0.92) (0.89) (-0.33) (-1.13) (-1.10)
Quarter 4 Before Crash ⇥ Crash 0.00020 0.00019 0.00028 0.00023 0.025 0.0016 0.0015
(0.44) (0.44) (0.15) (0.13) (0.92) (0.39) (0.36)
Quarter 3 Before Crash ⇥ Crash -0.000022 0.0000026 0.00029 0.00025 0.0095 0.0024 0.0022
(-0.05) (0.01) (0.17) (0.15) (0.75) (0.57) (0.55)
Quarter 2 Before Crash ⇥ Crash 0.00014 0.00014 0.0033 0.0031 0.030 0.014 0.014
(0.32) (0.32) (1.40) (1.38) (0.98) (1.84) (1.81)
Quarter 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash -0.000096 -0.000081 0.00026 0.00022 -0.0028 0.012 0.011
(-0.22) (-0.19) (0.15) (0.13) (-0.55) (1.59) (1.57)
Quarter 2 After Crash ⇥ Crash 0.00018 0.00020 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0059 -0.0010 -0.0013
(0.41) (0.45) (-0.88) (-0.92) (-1.82) (-0.31) (-0.40)
Quarter 3 After Crash ⇥ Crash 0.00037 0.00038 0.00062 0.00057 0.0061 0.0047 0.0047
(0.83) (0.86) (0.35) (0.32) (0.58) (0.99) (0.99)
Quarter 4 After Crash ⇥ Crash -0.00019 -0.00018 -0.0022 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0052 0.0049
(-0.47) (-0.44) (-1.78) (-1.83) (0.34) (0.99) (0.96)
New Car -0.00084⇤⇤ -0.00098⇤ 0.000011
(-7.87) (-2.23) (0.01)
New Car Missing 0.0012 0.0032 0.016
(1.52) (0.99) (1.31)
Driver Age 0.00054⇤⇤ 0.0013⇤⇤ 0.0014⇤⇤
(8.90) (5.44) (2.68)
Driver Age2 -0.0000080⇤⇤ -0.000017⇤⇤ -0.000017⇤⇤
(-10.22) (-5.47) (-2.69)
Male 0.00073⇤⇤ 0.00088⇤ 0.0014
(6.94) (2.00) (1.62)
Crash in prior 1 years 0.0021⇤⇤ 0.0011 0.0022
(8.70) (1.28) (1.20)
Two Prior Crashes 0.0040⇤⇤ 0.0018 0.0091
(3.71) (0.56) (1.17)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of cases 1846367 1846367 152159 152159 9217 40405 40405
Ref. Bankruptcy Probability 0.0056 0.0056 0.0090 0.0090 0.0098 0.0079 0.0079
F-Test for Future Periods 0.69 0.68 0.29 0.27 0.40 0.11 0.10
Marginal e↵ects; t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01
50
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Edward R. Morrison 
 emorrison@law.uchicago.edu 
  
 
 Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1–600 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
601. David A. Weisbach, Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary? June 2012 
602. Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other 
Law, June 2012 
603. David S. Evans, Excessive Litigation by Business Users of Free Platform Services, June 2012 
604. Ariel Porat, Mistake under the Common European Sales Law, June 2012 
605. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contrat Evolution, June 2012 
606. Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, July 2012 
607 Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, July 2012 
608. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, July 2012 
609. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic 
Cooperation, July 2012 
610. M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach to 
Regulatory Assignments, August 2012 
611. Joseph Isenbergh, Cliff Schmiff, August 2012 
612. Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?  A 
Reevaluastion of Explanations for Judicial Independence, August 2012 
613. M. Todd Henderson, Voice versus Exit in Health Care Policy, October 2012 
614. Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker” 
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures, October 2012 
615. William H. J. Hubbard, Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys, October 2012 
616. Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012 
617. Ariel Porat, Negligence Liability for Non-Negligent Behavior, November 2012 
618. William A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch, November 2012 
619. David S. Evans and Elisa V. Mariscal, The Role of Keyword Advertisign in Competition among 
Rival Brands, November 2012 
620. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and 
Reliable Index of interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial 
Discussion Paper, November 2012 
621. Reid Thompson and David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, November 2012 
622. Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, November 2012 
623. David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform 
Businesses, December 2012 
624. James Melton, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Kalev Leetaru, On the Interpretability of Law: 
Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions, December 2012 
625. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December 2012 
626. David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms, January 2013 
627. David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis, January 2013 
628. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis, January 2013 
629. M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver’s Seat?, January 2013 
630. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 
January 2013 
631. Randal C. Picker, Access and the Public Domain, February 2013 
632. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013 
633. Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, February 2013 
634. Arial Porat and Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 
February 2013 
635. Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013 
636. Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract?   March 2013 
637. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013 
638. M. Todd Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, March 2013 
639 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, April 2013 
640. Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An Apologia, April 2013 
 
 641. Anthony J. Casey and Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, May 2013 
642. William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum 
Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013 
643. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying as Efficient Corporate Governance, May 
2013 
644. Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency 
Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, June 2013 
645. Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path 
Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013 
646.  Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
  Boards, July 2013 
647.  Mary Anne Case, Is There a Lingua Franca for the American Legal Academy? July 2013 
648.  Bernard Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of the 
  Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013 
649. Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic 
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013 
650.  Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic 
Rights as “Insurance Swaps”, August 2013 
651. Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Audits as Signals, August 
2013 
652. Elisabeth J. Moyer, Michael D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter, and David A. Weisbach, Climate 
Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon, August 
2013 
653. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in 
Corporate Reorganization, September 2013 
654. Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on Crime and 
Punishment”—A Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard 
Harcourt: The Second Session, September 2013 
655. Edward R. Morrison, Arpit Gupta, Lenora M. Olson, Lawrence J. Cook, and Heather 
Keenan, Health and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and 
Consumer Bankruptcy, October 2013 
 
 
